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We study perfectly secure message transmission (SMT) in general
synchronous networks where processors and communication lines may
be Byzantine faulty. Dolev et al. (J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 40, No. 1,
1747, Jan. 1993) first posed and solved the problem; our work
significantly improves on their algorithms in the number of communica-
tion bits and the amount of local computation. Hence, our algorithms
are better suited for traditional and fiber-optic networks than previous
algorithms while requiring the same amount of connectivity. The algo-
rithms we develop do not rely on any complexity theoretic assumptions
and simultaneously achieve the three goals of perfect secrecy, perfect
resiliency, and worst case time that is linear in the diameter of the
network. Our algorithms assume that the containment assumption holds,
i.e., there is effectively one adversary who controls and coordinates the
activities of the faulty processors and lines. In SMT, a processor
(Sender) wishes to transmit a secret message to another processor
(Receiver) in such a way as to satisfy secrecy and resiliency requirements
simultaneously. In 1-way SMT, Sender can send information to Receiver
via the wires that connect them, but Receiver cannot send information to
Sender. In 2-way SMT, Sender and Receiver can send information to
each other via the wires. A phase is a send from Sender to Receiver or
vice versa. First, we develop a 3-phase algorithm for 2-way SMT. Next,
we present a 2-phase algorithm for 2-way SMT. To our knowledge, this
is the first 2-phase algorithm for SMT that uses communication and
computation costs that are polynomial in the number of wires that
connect the sender and the receiver. The second algorithm uses less
time and more communication bits than the first algorithm. Both the
2-phase and 3-phase algorithms employ new techniques to detect
faulty paths. We also present a simple algorithm for 1-way SMT.
] 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario in which some commercial bank
Sender sends financial records to another bank Receiver via
n node-disjoint paths, where n1. An intruder is an external
agent, different from Sender and Receiver, that has access to
{ wires, where {n. Bank Receiver requires the financial
records to be perfectly secure, i.e., no intruder can learn the
actual contents of the financial records and the records are
not altered in any way. Dolev et al. [5] were the first to pose
and solve this problem, which they called the secure
message transmission (SMT) problem.
Dolev et al. define the SMT problem as follows: ‘‘In SMT,
two synchronized non-faulty processors called Sender and
Receiver are connected by a number n of wires. We think of
these wires as a collection of vertex-disjoint paths between
Sender and Receiver in the underlying network; each path
corresponds to a wire. Sender has a secret message m, drawn
from a finite field Q of possible messages. There are two
parameters, _ (for secrecy) and \ (for resiliency). The
problem is for Sender to convey m to Receiver while sat-
isfying:
Perfect Secrecy: For all sets L of at most _ wires, no
listening adversary AL , listening to all the wires of L, learns
anything about m.
Perfect Resiliency: For all sets D of at most \ wires
(possibly, but not necessarily, disjoint from L), Receiver
correctly learns m, regardless of the disrupting adversary AD
controlling and coordinating the behaviors of the wires in D.
Since each wire corresponds to a path in the underlying
network, a compromised wire in SMT corresponds to a
compromised processor or edge on the corresponding
network path.’’
Dolev et al. differentiate between 1-way SMT and 2-way
SMT. In 1-way SMT, Sender can send information to
Receiver via the n wires that connect them, but Receiver
cannot send information to Sender. In 2-way SMT, Sender
and Receiver can send information to each other via the n
wires.
The case in which AD and AL are constrained so that
DL or LD is an important one, and in this case we say
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the containment assumption holds. If DL (respectively,
LD) is true, then all information available to AD (respec-
tively, AL) is also available to AL (respectively, AD). Thus,
there is effectively one adversary when the containment
assumption holds. This is the worst case assumption made
in several previous papers treating secrecy and resiliency
simultaneously [24, 7, 9]. Let {=max[_, \]. Under the
containment assumption, Dolev et al. proved that an algo-
rithm for 1-way SMT is possible if and only if n satisfies
n{+2\+1. In our paper, we also provide a simple 1-way
algorithm that solves SMT under the containment assump-
tion. The 1-way SMT problem has an interesting relation to
verifiable secret sharing (VSS), a problem first defined by
Chor et al. [4]. Dolev et al. [5] reduce a weakened version
of 1-way SMT to VSS so that each processor in the VSS
protocol corresponds to a wire in the SMT protocol. They
then prove a lower bound on n of 3\+1 for the weakened
1-way SMT, and hence for VSS. VSS plays a central role in
implementing a global coin [6], as well as in the more
general results of [2, 3, 9].
Under the containment assumption, Dolev el al. [5] also
proved that if the communication is 2-way, then n
{+\+1 wires are necessary and sufficient for SMT. A
phase is a send from Sender to Receiver or vice versa. Dolev
et al. developed a 3-phase algorithm for 2-way SMT. The
algorithm achieves simultaneously the three goals of perfect
secrecy, perfect resiliency, and worst case time that is linear
in the diameter of the network. However, the algorithm
creates a large number of polynomials and uses a large
number of communication bits. Specifically, the algorithm
requires Sender to produce \n+1 pads and create for each
pad a polynomial of degree {, where a pad is a message
chosen uniformly at random from the field Q of possible
messages and independent of the secret. For each polyno-
mial, Sender produces n values, and Sender produces
another polynomial of degree { for each of these n values. In
other words, Sender creates n(\n+1) polynomials. Next,
Sender sends the coefficients of \n+1 polynomials through
each wire to Receiver. Also, Sender sends the value of each
of the n(\n+1) polynomials evaluated at the wire number.
Hence, Sender sends ({+1)(\n+1)+n(\n+1) values
through each wire to Receiver. In response, Receiver may
need to send n(({+1)(\n)+n(\n)) values through each
wire to Sender. Table 1 presents a summary of the number
of polynomials and values that Dolev et al.’s algorithm uses.
(For a discussion about what happens when the contain-
ment assumption does not hold, please refer to [5].)
For the case when the containment assumption holds in
2-way SMT, we develop a 3-phase algorithm that requires
Sender to produce only n pads and create for each pad a
polynomial of degree {. (We call the pads keys in our algo-
rithms.) Next, for each wire, Sender sends the coefficients of
some polynomial through the wire to Receiver. Also, Sender
sends the value of each of the n polynomials evaluated at the
TABLE 1
Number of Polynomials and Values for 2-Way 3-Phase SMT Algorithms
Our work Dolev et al. (1993)
Number of created polynomials n n(\n+1)
Number of values Sender sends {+1+n ({+1)(\n+1)+n(\n+1)
Number of values Rec. sends \n+\ n({+1)(\n)+\n3
wire number. Hence, Sender sends {+1+n values through
each wire to Receiver. In response, Receiver may need to
send only \n+\ values through each wire to Sender.
Table 1 presents a summary of the number of polynomials
and values that our algorithm uses. In traditional networks,
where communication is the bottleneck [1], our algorithm
will be more efficient than Dolev et al.’s algorithm. In fiber
optic networks, where communication is not a problem but
computation is the bottleneck [1], Dolev et al.’s algorithm
requires nodes to create n(\n+1) polynomials, whereas our
algorithm requires nodes to create only n polynomials.
Hence, even for fiber optic networks, our algorithm will be
much faster and much more suitable to implement than
Dolev et al.’s algorithm.
We also present a 2-phase algorithm for 2-way SMT
under the containment assumption. To our knowledge, this
is the first 2-phase algorithm for SMT that uses communica-
tion and computation costs that are polynomial in n. The
2-phase algorithm requires Receiver to create at most
n+\+1 polynomials and to send only {+1+n values
through each wire to Sender. Sender is required to create
only one polynomial and to send at most \n+2\+1 values
through each wire to Receiver. Both the 2-phase and
3-phase algorithms employ new techniques to detect faulty
wires.
In Sections 2 and 3, we reproduce the definitions and
assumptions that Dolev et al. used. Readers who are already
familiar with Dolev et al.’s work can skip what follows and
directly read Section 4.
2. ADVERSARIES
An adversary is an algorithm that takes as input transmis-
sion on certain wires, random bits, and the phase number,
and produces a choice of wires together with either (faulty)
traffic on the chosen wires, in the case of the disrupting
adversary AD , or a guess of the message being transmitted,
in the case of the listening adversary, AL . A wire tapped or
under the control of an adversary is said to be compromised.
A wire under the control of AD is said to be faulty. For our
algorithm, our adversaries may be adaptive, in the sense
that information (communication traffic) obtained from a
set of compromised wires can affect the choice of the next
wire to be compromised.
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When sender and receiver send the same copy of a
message through all the disjoint wires, then it is guaranteed
that the message will be delivered correctly to the destina-
tion, but the secrecy of the message will be lost. If all the
disjoint wires are used to send the same message, then we say
that the message is sent through a perfect public channel. On
the other hand, if a message is sent through a particular wire
between sender and receiver, then we say that the message
is sent through a private channel. Our two way protocols
use both public and private channels. Any wire other than
the disjoint wires between sender and receiver is called back
channel. Our algorithms operate under the containment
assumption. Hence, AL and AD can communicate through
back channels.
3. DEFINITIONS
Sender and Receiver are modeled by communicating
probabilistic Turning machines that communicate through
the n wires connecting them. Randomization is modeled by
coin flipping. All messages are drawn from a finite field Q of
prime cardinality at least n. We denote the underlying prob-
ability distribution on Q by 6. We assume that each of the
n wires has a unique non-zero label chosen from the finite
field Q, and each wire has the same label in both Sender and
Receiver. For simplicity, we assume that the wires have
labels 1, 2, ..., n.
Let AL be a listening adversary. For every SMT protocol,
we require that for all messages m and m$, and for all disrup-
ting adversaries AD , the probability distribution on AL ’s
view, given that the message is m and the disrupting adver-
sary is AD , is identical to the probability distribution on
AL ’s view, given that the message transmitted is m$ and the
adversary is still AD . Here, the probability space is the space
of all coin tosses of AL , AD , Sender, and Receiver, and the
view of AL is everything seen by AL . Note that the view of
AL includes information received from AD through the back
channel.
For every message m # Q, any pair of adversaries AL , AD ,
and any protocol P for SMT, 6(AL , m, AD , P) denotes the
probability distribution, on the views of AL at the end of the
executions of P when the message sent is m and the disrupt-
ing adversary is AD . The probability distribution is taken
over the coin tosses of AD , AL , Sender, and Receiver.
Definition: (_, \)-Secure Message Transmission ((_, \)-
SMT). Let Sender begin with a message m drawn from an
arbitrary probability distribution 6 on Q. For every AL ,
AD , compromising at most _ and \ wires, respectively, we
need:
Secrecy: \m$ # Q 6(AL , m, AD , P)=6(AL , m$, AD , P).
Resiliency: Receiver correctly learns m.
In particular, the secrecy requirement implies that at any
point in the execution AL has absolutely no information
about which message is being transmitted. It follows that
the choice of L is independent of the message being trans-
mitted, as is the probability distribution on conversations
over wires in L.
A solution to 1-way (_, \)-SMT runs in exactly one syn-
chronous phase. A solution to 2-way (_, \)-SMT is a solution
of two or more phases. Note that if _=0 then there is no
secrecy requirement, and if \=0 then there is no resiliency
requirement.
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE 2-WAY 3-PHASE ALGORITHM
4.1. Informal Description of the Algorithm
The three phase algorithm is initiated by Sender S. Sup-
pose {=max(_, \). As in Dolev et al. [5], we assume that
n equals {+\+1, the minimum value necessary for 2-way
SMT under the containment assumption. S randomly
chooses a set of n keys from the finite set Q of possible
messages, and S associates a key Ki with wire i, where
1in. For each key Ki , S forms a polynomial
fi (x) # Q(x) of degree {, where fi (0)=Ki and the other coef-
ficients of fi (x) are chosen randomly from Q. Then, S sends
through each wire i the coefficients of polynomial fi (x) and
the values fj (i) where 1i, jn. When S sends fi (x)
through wire i, we say that S sends Ki on wire i.
Upon receiving the information from S, Receiver R
creates two sets of lists called AList(i) and BList(i) for
each wire i. Since S and R are synchronized, R knows that
a wire is faulty if the wire does not deliver values within a
pre-determined period of time. R ignores all values that
arrive on such a wire. For each wire i, we denote the poly-
nomial that R receives from i as pi (x), and the values that
R receives from i as vj (i). If the values are not changed then
pi (x)#fi (x) and vj (i)=fj (i). For each wire i, AList(i)
contains the labels j of wires such that vi ( j)=pi ( j), i.e., the
labels of wires through which R received values that satisfy
the polynomial for wire i. In particular, if i is not faulty, then
i # AList(i). Conversely, for each wire i, BList(i) contains
the labels j of wires such that vi ( j){pi ( j), i.e., the labels of
wires through which R received values that do not satisfy
the polynomial for wire i. As we will show in Lemma 4.2, if
some AList(u) contains less than {+1 entries, then wire u
must be faulty. Hence, R discards each AList(u) that
contains less than {+1 entries and inserts u in a list
called faultywirelist(R). The wires that are not inserted
in the faultywirelist(R) are included in another list called
the viablewirelist(R). A known-faulty wire is a wire in
faultywirelist(R).
The wires in viablewirelist(R) may or may not be
faulty, as follows. Each polynomial of degree { is completely
determined by {+1 different values. Hence, the disrupting
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adversary may create a new polynomial P on some faulty
wire j and change some values on the faulty wires such that
P is satisfied by {+1 values. Hence, some faulty wires may
be included in viablewirelist(R).
R considers all values that were received on known-faulty
wires as suspect. Hence, for each known-faulty wire j, R
removes j from each AList and BList. If the number of
entries in some AList(v) becomes less than {+1, then R
considers v as known-faulty, puts v in faultywirelist(R),
removes v from viablewirelist(R), discards AList(v) and
BList(v), and removes v from each AList and BList. This
procedure continues until no more wires are added to
faultywirelist(R). At this point, R has a list of faulty wires
that R has detected. Hence, R broadcasts faultywirelist(R)
to S via the public channel. At this point also, for each viable
wire i, R has a BList(i) that specifies which wires w had
values that disagreed with the polynomial pi (x) received on
i. There can be three cases, depending on the states of w and
i: (1) i is not faulty and w is faulty, (2) i is faulty and w is not
faulty, or (3) i is faulty and w is faulty. In case (1), pi (x) is the
polynomial that S sent on i and vi (w) is not the value that
S sent on w. In case (2), vi (w) is the value that S sent on w
and pi (x) is not the polynomial that S sent on i. In case (3),
vi (w) and pi (x) were not sent by S. To distinguish among the
three cases, R creates another list, BValueList(i), that
specifies vi (w) for each w in BList(i), and broadcasts
BValueList(i) to S via the public channel. For each
known-faulty wire j, R sets BValueList( j) to NULL and
broadcasts BValueList( j) to S via the public channel.
Upon receiving faultywirelist(R) and BValueList(i),
for each wire i, S creates a list faultywirelist(S), where
faultywirelist(S) initially contains only the wires in
faultywirelist(R). Next, S attempts to discover additional
faulty wires as follows. For each value vi (w) in
BvalueList(i), S checks whether S sent vi (w) on w, i.e.,
whether vi (w)=fi (w). If vi (w)=fi (w), then S concludes
that wire i must be faulty, and adds i to faultywirelist(S).
If vi (w){fi (w), then S concludes that wire w must be faulty,
and adds w to faultywirelist(S). After S finishes adding
wires to faultywirelist(S), S puts all wires not in
faultywirelist(S) in a new list viablewirelist(S). S then
broadcasts viablewirelist(S) to R via the public channel.
A viable key is a key that S sent on a wire contained in
viablewirelist(S). S takes the exclusive-or (EXOR) of all
the viable keys together with the secret message m that S
wishes to send to R, and S broadcasts the result Y to R via
the public channel.
Upon receiving viablewirelist(S) and Y from Sender, R
extracts the viable keys from the polynomials that R already
has, and then extracts m from Y.
Pseudo-Code Description of the 2-Way 3-Phase Algo-
rithm. Appendix A has a pseudo-code description of the
algorithm.
4.2. Proof of Correctness
Note that any value broadcast on the public channel, i.e.,
all wires, by Sender to Receiver or by Receiver to Sender
will be received correctly but the secrecy of the message will
be lost.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that i is a non-faulty wire. Then i
will be in viablewirelist(R).
Proof. Since wire i is non-faulty, then pi (x)#fi (x) and
vj (i)=fj (i) for each j. In particular, vi (i)=fi (i). In other
words, the value that R received on wire i satisfies polyno-
mial pi (x). By assumption, there are at least {+1 non-faulty
wires. Hence, there are at least { wires w other than i with
the property that the value vi (w) that w carried for wire i
satisfies pi (x), i.e., vi (w)=pi (w). Hence, i will be in
viablewirelist(R). Note that no non-faulty wire w will be
removed from viablewirelist(R) because w will have at
least {+1 values that satisfy pw(x). K
Lemma 4.2. If a wire j is in faultywirelist(R), then j is
faulty.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.2 is true. K
The following lemma shows that no additional informa-
tion is revealed to the Listening Adversary AL when
Receiver sends faultywirelist(R) and BValueLists to
Sender via the public channel.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that wire i is not compromised.
Then, after Receiver sends BValueList(i) to Sender via the
public channel, the Listening Adversary AL knows at most {
values of fi (x).
Proof. Suppose that BValueList(i) equals [vi (w1),
vi (w2), ..., vi (wk)], for some k. It is sufficient to show that
k\.
Since wire i is not faulty, then fi (x) is identical to pi (x).
Each non-faulty wire w delivers a value vi (w) that is iden-
tical to pi (w). Hence, Receiver does not put vi (w) in
BValueList(i). Since there are at most \ faulty wires that
can change polynomial values, then k\. K
The following lemma shows that faultywirelist(S) con-
tains all wires that carried a faulty polynomial or carried at
least one faulty value of a polynomial for a non-faulty wire.
lemma 4.4. The list faultywirelist(S) contains all
wires j such that either (1) pj (x) is not identical to fj (x), or
(2) pj (x)#fj (x) and vi ( j){fi ( j) for some non-faulty wire i.
Proof. v Consider the case when wire j carries a faulty
polynomial pj (x).
If R discovers that j is faulty, then R inserts j in
faultywirelist(R) and broadcasts faultywirelist(R) to S.
Hence, S will also insert j in faultywirelist(S), and
Lemma 4.4 will be true.
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If R does not discover that j is faulty, then at least one
non-faulty wire i will have a value vj (i) that does not match
with pj (x), i.e., pj (i){vj (i). Hence, R inserts vj (i) in
BValueList( j) and broadcasts BValueList( j) to S.
When S receives the list, S compares vj (i) with fj (i), dis-
covers that vj (i)=fj (i), and inserts j in faultywirelist(S).
Hence, Lemma 4.4 will be true.
v Now consider the case when pj (x)#fj (x) but j falsifies
the value vi ( j) of a polynomial fi (x) for some non-faulty
wire i. By Lemma 4.1, wire i is in viablewirelist(R). Hence,
by the algorithm, R inserts vi ( j) in BValueList(i) and
broadcasts the list to S. When S receives the list, S compares
vi ( j) with fi ( j), discovers that vi ( j){fi ( j), and inserts j in
faultywirelist(S). Hence, Lemma 4.4 will be true. K
Lemma 4.5. If wire i is not faulty, then i will be in
viablewirelist(S).
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, wire i will not be in faultywire
list(R). Suppose that R inserts in BValueList( j) some value
vj (i) that was carried on i. This can happen, for example, if
wire j carried a faulty polynomial, as in Lemma 4.4. R broad-
casts BValueList( j) to S. When S receives the list, S com-
pares vj (i) with fj (i), discovers that vj (i)=fj (i), and does not
insert i in faultywirelist(S). K
Lemma 4.6 (Secrecy). The algorithm guarantees secrecy
under the containment assumption, provided that n
{+\+1.
Proof. We say that a key K is an exposed key if Sender
sends a polynomial p(x) containing K=p(0) on a com-
promised wire that delivers the polynomial and all other
values without change. In our algorithm, S cannot detect
exposed keys. Hence, before sending the secret message m to
R, S will take the EXOR of m with the keys sent on paths
in viablewirelist(S). It is possible that the EXOR contains
exposed keys. Note that AL knows all the exposed keys.
However, AL does not know the hidden keys, i.e., the keys
that S sent on non-compromised wires. This is true because,
by Lemma 4.3, AL can know at most { of the values of the
polynomials for non-compromised wires. Since the polyno-
mials are of degree {, it is not possible for AL to compute
these polynomials correctly from the { values. By
Lemma 4.5, there are at least \+1 hidden keys. Because S
broadcasts the EXOR of m with the keys sent in polyno-
mials on paths in viablewirelist(S), 6(AL , m, AD , P)=
6(AL , m$, AD , P) for every m, m$ # Q. K
Lemma 4.7 (Resiliency). The algorithm guarantees
resiliency under the containment assumption, provided that
n{+\+1.
Proof. If a wire j carries a faulty polynomial, then S
includes j in faultywirelist(S) by Lemma 4.4. Since S
broadcasts viablewirelist(S) to R, R knows which wires
carried non-faulty polynomials. In other words, R knows
which keys S uses. K
5. DESCRIPTION OF THE 2-WAY 2-PHASE
ALGORITHM
5.1. Informal Description of the 2-Phase Algorithm
The 2-phase algorithm is similar to the 3-phase algorithm
presented above. Unlike the 3-phase algorithm, the 2-phase
algorithm is initiated by Receiver R. All the work done by
Sender in the first round in the 3-phase algorithm is done by
Receiver in its first round in the 2-phase algorithm. In other
words, R chooses a set of n keys from the finite set Q of
possible messages, and R associates each key Ki with wire i,
where 1in. For each key Ki , R forms a polynomial
fi (x) # Q(x) of degree { where fi (0)=Ki . Then, R sends
through each wire i the coefficients of polynomial fi (x) and
the values fj (i) where 1i, jn.
All the work done by Receiver in the first round in the
3-phase algorithm is done by Sender in its first round in
the 2-phase algorithm. In other words, upon receiving
all the information from R, Sender S creates two sets of lists
called AList(i) and BList(i) for each wire i. S constructs
the ALists and B Lists in the same way as R constructed
the ALists and BLists in the 3-phase algorithm. Also,
S constructs a faultywirelist(S) and viablewirelist(S)
in the same way that R constructed faultywirelist(R)
and viablewirelist(R) in the 3-phase algorithm. As in the
algorithm for R in the 3-phase algorithm, S broadcasts
faultywirelist(S) and BValueList(i), for each wire i, to
R via the public channel.
Unlike the 3-phase algorithm, however, S also constructs
a secretcarryingpolynomial M(x) of degree n where the
coefficient of x0 (=a0) is the secret message m, and the coef-
ficient of xi (=ai) is the key carried by the polynomial pi (x)
that S received on wire i, where i{0 and i is in
viablewirelist(S). If a wire j is in faultywirelist(S), then
the coefficient of x j (=aj) is set to zero in M(x). Let #
equal min[\, [number of wires in viablewirelist(S)&
({+1)]]. Intuitively, # indicates the maximum number of
viable wires that may be faulty. (Note that if n is equal to
\+{+1, then [number of wires in viablewirelist(S)&
({+1)] is at most \. If n is greater than \+{+1, then
[number of wires in viablewirelist(S)&({+1)] can be
greater than \.) Then, S computes the vector of values Vm=
[M(i), where i=1, . . .#+1]. S broadcasts Vm to R via the
public channel.
Upon receiving faultywirelist(S), BValueList(i), for
each wire i, and Vm from S, Receiver R creates a list
faultywirelist(R), where faultywirelist(R) initially con-
tains only the wires in faultywirelist(S). As in the
3-phase algorithm, R uses the BValueLists to discover
additional faulty wires. After R finishes adding wires to
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faultywirelist(R), R puts all wires not in faultywire
list(R) in a new list viablewirelist(R). R reconstructs the
secretcarryingpolynomial M(x) as follows. If wire i is in
viablewirelist(R), then R uses as the coefficient of xi in
M(x) the key Ki that R sent on i. If wire j is in faultywire
list(S), and hence is in faultywirelist(R), then R sets the
coefficient of x j in M(x) to zero. If wire w is in faultywire
list(R) but is not in faultywirelist(S), then R leaves the
coefficient of xw in M(x) as an unknown. Hence, there can
be at most #+1 unknown coefficients (including the secret
message m). By using the Vm vector that S sent, R constructs
a system of #+1 linear equations with at most #+1
unknown variables. By solving the equations for the
unknowns, R constructs M(x) and extracts m.
Pseudo-Code Description of the 2-Way 2-Phase Algo-
rithm. Appendix B has a pseudo-code description of the
algorithm.
5.2. Proof of Correctness
Since the 2-phase algorithm is similar to the 3-phase algo-
rithm presented in Section 4, many of the proofs are the
same. In particular, Lemmas 4.1 to 4.5 remain valid for the
2-phase algorithm except that the words Sender and
Receiver need to be interchanged, and the symbols R and S
need to be interchanged. We provide two more lemmas to
complete the proof of correctness for the 2-phase algorithm.
Lemma 5.1 (Secrecy). The algorithm guarantees secrecy
under the containment assumption, provided that n{+\+1.
Proof. We say that a key K is an exposed key if Sender
sends a polynomial p(x) containing K=p(0) on a com-
promised wire that delivers the polynomial and all other
values without change. In our algorithm, R cannot detect
exposed keys. Hence, before sending the secret message m
to R, S will create a secretcarryingpolynomial M(x) of
degree n, and S sends Vm through the public channel. AL
knows all the exposed keys, but AL does not know the hid-
den keys, i.e., the keys that R sent on non-compromised
wires. This is true because, by Lemma 4.3, AL can know at
most { of the values of the polynomials for non-com-
promised wires. Hence, there are at least {+\+2&{=
\+2 coefficients of M(x) that the Adversary does not
know. Vm provides #+1 values of M(x). By the choice of #,
# can be at most \. Hence, Vm provides at most \+1 values
of M(x). Thus, AL cannot solve for the M(x) coefficients
that AL does not know. Because S broadcasts m as a
coefficient of M(x), 6(AL , m, AD , P)=6(AL , m$, AD , P)
\m, m$ # Q. K
Lemma 5.2 (Resiliency). The algorithm guarantees
resiliency under the containment assumption, provided that
n{+\+1.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, no wire that transfers a faulty
polynomial or transfers at least one faulty value of a correct
polynomial will remain undetected by Receiver in its second
round calculation. Also, according to Lemma 4.5, no non-
faulty wire will be detected as faulty by R. For all non-faulty
wires, the keys used in the secretcarryingpolynomial
M(x) are the same as the ones sent by R. Also, S used the
coefficient zero for those faulty wires that S detected. Hence,
the only keys that R does not know are the ones carried by
compromised wires that S failed to detect. The number of
such wires is at most #, and, hence, the total number of
unknown coefficients in M(x) is at most #+1. Since S sends
#+1 values of M(x), R can form #+1 linear equations. By
solving them, R can find out all the #+1 unknown coef-
ficients, one of which is the secret m. K
6. DESCRIPTION OF THE 1-WAY ALGORITHM
6.1. Pseudo-Code Description of the Algorithm
Our one-phase algorithm is very straightforward. Let
{=max[_, \]. As in Dolev et al. [5], we assume that n
equals {+2\+1, the minimum value necessary for 1-way
SMT under the containment assumption.
Operation in Sender S:
(i) Choose n keys K1 , K2 , ..., Kn .
(ii) For each key Ki form a polynomial fi (x) # Q(x) of
degree { where Ki=fi (0).
(iii) For each wire i, compute the vector of values F(i)
where 1in and F(i)=[ f1(i), f2(i), ..., fn(i)].
(iv) For each wire i, send fi (x) and F(i) through wire i to
Receiver R.
(v) Sender takes the EXOR of all the keys and the secret
message m and sends the result Y(m) through each wire
to R.
Operation in Receiver R: As in the 3-phase algorithm,
upon receiving all the information from S, Receiver R
creates lists called AList(i) and BList(i) for each wire i,
and creates faultywirelist(R) and viablewirelist(R).
Unlike the 3-phase algorithm, however, wire j is faulty if
AList( j) contains less than {+\+1 wires.
For each wire i, we denote the polynomial that R receives
from i as pi (x), and the values that R receives from i as vj (i).
For every wire i in viablewirelist(R), R assumes that the
key that S sent on i is equal to pi (0). For every wire j in
faultywirelist(R), R reconstructs the polynomial fj (x) by
using the values vi ( j) that R received on each viable wire i.
As we show in Lemma 6.2, there are enough non-faulty
values vi ( j) for R to correctly reconstruct fj (x). After
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reconstructing fj (x), R assumes that the key that S sent on
j is equal to fj (0).
Once R finds the keys for each wire, then R finds the
secret message m be the EXOR of all keys with Y(m).
6.2. Proof of Correctness
Lemma 6.1 (Secrecy). The algorithm guarantees secre-
cy under the containment assumption, provided that n
{+2\+1.
Proof. We say that a key K is an exposed key if Sender
sends a polynomial p(x) containing K=p(0) on a com-
promised wire that delivers the polynomial and all other
values without change. In our algorithm, R cannot detect
exposed keys. Hence, before sending the secret message m to
R, S will take the EXOR of m with all keys. It is possible
that the EXOR contains exposed keys. Note that AL knows
all the exposed keys. However, AL does not know the hidden
keys, i.e., the keys that S sent on non-compromised wires.
This is true because AL has access to at most { wires and can
know at most { of the values of the polynomials for non-
compromised wires. Since the polynomials are of degree {,
it is not possible for AL to compute these polynomials
correctly from the { values. For each non-faulty wire i, there
are at least {+\+1 wires that deliver values satisfying
pi (x). Hence, viablewirelist(R) contains at least {+\+1
wires. Thus, there are at least 2\+1 hidden keys. Because S
broadcasts the EXOR of m with all keys, 6(AL , m, AD , P)=
6(AL , m$, AD , P) \m, m$ # Q. K
Lemma 6.2 (Resiliency). The algorithm guarantees
resiliency under the containment assumption, provided that
n{+2\+1.
Proof. Since the connectivity of the network is
{+2\+1, and only \ wires can be faulty due to disrupting
adversary, so R will receive at least {+\+1 values for each
polynomial correctly. A polynomial of degree { can be easily
constructed if {+\+1 values are available for that poly-
nomial.
If some wire i delivers a polynomial pi (x) to Receiver,
then there are two cases: (a) pi (x) is identical to fi (x), or
(b) pi (x) differs from fi (x). In case (a), there will be at least
{+\+1 wires that deliver values that satisfy pi (x). Hence,
Receiver computes Ki by computing pi (0).
In case (b), there can be at most \ faulty wires that deliver
values that satisfy pi (x) and there can be some additional
not-faulty wires that deliver values that satisfy pi (x). Note
that the number of non-faulty wires that deliver values that
satisfy pi (x) in case (b) must be smaller than {+1, else pi (x)
must equal fi (x). Hence, there can be at most { no-faulty
wires that deliver values that satisfy pi (x). In other words,
AList(i) will contain at most {+\ entries, and Receiver
will know that i is faulty. Receiver then can employ the
errors-and-erasures error-correcting schemes to correct the
faulty values that the \ faulty wires delivered for fi (x)
[5, 8]. K
7. CONCLUSION
We developed three SMT algorithms for the case when
the containment assumption holds. The 3-phase algorithm
is a significant improvement on Dolev et al.’s 3-phase algo-
rithm in terms of communication and computation. The
2-phase algorithm is the first 2-way SMT algorithm where
the cost of communication and computation is polynomial
in n. Both the 3-phase and 2-phase algorithms require
{+\+1 disjoint wires between Sender and Receiver. Our
1-phase algorithm requires {+2\+1 disjoint wires between
Sender and Receiver.
APPENDIX A: PSEUDO-CODE DESCRIPTION OF THE
2-WAY 3-PHASE ALGORITHM
Suppose {=max(_, \) and n={+\+1.
First round operation in Sender S:
(i) Choose n keys K1 , K2 , ..., Kn .
(ii) For each key Ki form a polynomial fi (x) # Q(x) of
degree { where Ki=fi (0).
(iii) For each wire i, compute the vector of values F(i)
where 1in and F(i)=[ f1(i), f2(i), ..., fn(i)].
(iv) For each wire i, send fi (x) and F(i) through wire i to
Receiver R.
First round operation in Receiver R: Let us denote the
polynomial received through wire i as pi (x) and the vector
of values received through wire i as V(i) where V(i, j) means
the j th element of vector V(i). If i is not faulty, then V(i) is
the same as F(i).
For 1in
For 1jn
IF V( j, i)=pi ( j), then include wire j in AList(i)
Else include j in BList(i)
End For
End For
LOOP: For 1in
IF AList(i) contains {+1 wires, then include i in
viablewirelist(R)
Else include i in the faultywire list(R).
End For
changecount=0;
For each i # viablewirelist(R)
IF AList(i) contains wire j that is also in
faultywirelist(R), then remove j from AList(i) and
changecount++;
59EFFICIENT PERFECTLY SECURE MESSAGE TRANSMISSION
File: 643J 255208 . By:CV . Date:04:06:96 . Time:16:16 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 4728 Signs: 2776 . Length: 56 pic 0 pts, 236 mm
End For
IF changecount>0, then JUMP LOOP
END LOOP
For each i # viablewirelist(R)
IF BList(i) contains wire j that is also in
faultywirelist(R), then remove j from BList(i).
End For
For each i # viablewirelist(R)
For each j # BList(i) include V( j, i) in
BValueList(i).
End For
For each i # viablewirelist(R)
Send BValueList(i) through all the wires.
End For
Send faultywirelist(R) through all the wires.
Second round operation in Sender S:
Upon receiving faultywirelist(R) and BValueList(i),
for each wire i, from Receiver, faultywirelist(S)=
faultywirelist(R).
viablewirelist(S)=all wires not in faultywirelist(S).
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
For each V( j, i) # BValueList(i)
IF V( j, i){fi ( j), then include j in the faultywire
list(S) if not already included,
Else include i in the faultywirelist(S) if not already
included.
End For
End For
X=0;
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
X=XKi
End For
Y=mX.
Send Y through all wires.
Send viablewirelist(S) through all wires.
Second round operation in Receiver R:
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
X=XKi
End For
m=XY
END of ALGORITHM
APPENDIX B: PSEUDO-CODE DESCRIPTION OF THE
2-WAY 2-PHASE ALGORITHM
Suppose {=max(_, \) and n=_+\+1.
First round operation in Receiver R:
(i) Choose n keys K1 , K2 , ..., Kn .
(ii) For each Ki form a polynomial fi (x) # Q(x) of degree
{ where Ki=fi (0).
(iii) For each wire i, compute the vector of values F(i)
where 1in and F(i)=[ f1(i), f2(i), ..., fn(i)].
(iv) For each wire i, send fi (x) and F(i) trough wire i to
Sender S.
First round operation in Sender S: Let us denote the poly-
nomial received through wire i as pi (x) and the vector of
values received through wire i as V(i) where V(i, j) means
the j th element of vector V(i). If i is not faulty, then V(i) is
the same as F(i).
For 1in
For 1jn
IF V( j, i)=pi ( j), then include wire j in AList(i)
Else include j in BList(i)
End For
End For
LOOP: For 1in
IF AList(i) contains {+1 wires, then include i in
viablewirelist(S)
Else include i in the faultywirelist(S).
End For
changecount=0;
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
IF AList(i) contains wire j that is also in
faultywirelist(S), then remove j from AList(i) and
changecount++;
End For
IF changecount>0, then JUMP LOOP
End LOOP
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
IF BList(i) contains wire j that is also in
faultywirelist(S), then remove j from BList(i).
End For
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
For each j # BList(i) include V( j, i) in
BValueList(i).
End For
Form a Secret Carrying Polynomial M(x) of degree n,
where m=M(0)=co-eff. of x0,
For each i # viablewirelist(S)
ai=co.eff. of xi=key received through wire i
End For
For each i # faultywirelist(S)
ai=co-eff. of xi=0
End For
End of Forming Secret Carrying Polynomial.
#=min[\, number of wires in viablewirelist(S)&
({+1)]
Form vector Vm=[M(1), M(2), ..., M(#+1)]
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For each i # viablewirelist(S)
Send BValueList(i) through all the wires.
End For
Send faultywirelist(S) through all the wires.
Send Vector Vm through all the wires.
Second round operation in Receiver R:
Upon receiving faultywirelist(R), BValueList(i), for
each wire i, and Vm from Sender,
faultywirelist(R)=faultywirelist(S).
viablewirelist(R)=all wires not in faultywirelist(R).
For each i # viablewirelist(R)
For each j # BValueList(i)
IF V( j, i){fi ( j), then include j in the faultywire
list(R) if not already included,
Else include i in the faultywirelist(R) if not already
included.
End For
End For
Recreate the Secret Carrying Polynomial M(x) by set-
ting, for the co-efficient ai of each xi
ai=key sent through wire i if i # viablewirelist(R)
ai=0 if i # faultywirelist(S)
ai=bi for i # faultywirelist(R) and i  faultywire
list(S) where bi is unknown
Use vector Vm to solve for the unknowns.
The secret m is M(0).
END of ALGORITHM.
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